The lightning invasion of Italy by Charles VIII of France in 1494 shattered a delicate 40-year peace and opened a brutal chapter in European history. Up until 1516, when the conflict became part of the wider Habsburg-Valois conflagration, the Italian peninsula was the battleground of Europe. In investigating the causes of this conflict, this article will take as its basic premise the idea that there are really two dimensions to the issue – what caused the conflict to start in 1494, and what caused it to last until 1516.

A. SURFACE CAUSES FOR THE OUTBREAK OF WAR IN 1494: NAPLES, MILAN AND FRANCE.

            The first phase of the conflict which engulfed the peninsula began when Ludovico Sforza of Milan invited Charles VIII of France to attack Naples in 1494. It therefore makes sense to start by looking at those three states first.

1. Naples: This was a backward feudal monarchy led by a rumoured psychopath (although the story that King Ferrante embalmed his opponents to gloat over is probably apocryphal). Ferrante was desperate for foreign glory to answer those critics who had been driven to rebellion in 1485. He was even more nervy with the threats posed to his throne by Ferdinand, the Dukes of Anjou, and the Pope. Ferrante also resented the fact that his daughter and son-in-law were being prevented from ruling Milan by their grasping Regent, Ludovico Sforza. On the other hand, it is hardly surprising that Naples was suspicious of the other states after they let her down so badly in the Otranto crisis; besides, after 1505 Naples was effectively the pawn of Aragon and cannot be held responsible for subsequent events.

2. Milan: In many ways, there is also a cast-iron case against Ludovico Sforza, the ruler who many historians see as a first rate idiot who “let loose a lion in his house in order to catch a mouse”. He had blatantly usurped the Duchy from his nephew, over whom he claimed “guardianship”. He had so overtaxed his subjects to pay for his lavish cultural tastes that they welcomed the invading forces of Louis XII in 1499. His counter-attack in 1500 with Maximilian was a failure and he ended his days in a French dungeon. On the other hand, he was at least quick to turn against the French when he realised what a genie he had let out of the bottle. In this sense, Milan may well have started the wars, but had the other states acted as decisively against the French as the Milanese did then the wars would have finished a great deal earlier.

3. France: In 1494 Charles VIII was in a good position to invade and as an “ugly and ill-formed” King he was especially eager to achieve military glory. As well as having a dynastic claim to Naples, the domestic situation was very favourable - Louis XI had pacified the ducal families, and France possessed the only standing army (with 8000 Swiss Pikemen) in Europe. Diplomatically, Henry VII was bought off in the Treaty of Etaples (1492); Ferdinand and Isabella were given back Cerdagne and Rousillon; the Emperor Maximillian was given concessions in the Treaty of Senlis. In other words, Charles was not dragged into these wars unwillingly. Had he not dropped dead at a tennis match in 1498 he would have mounted another campaign against the peninsula, although in the end it made no difference – his successors Louis XII and Francis I were equally eager to enter the fray on their own accounts.

B. SURFACE CAUSES FOR THE PROLONGATION OF WAR TO 1516: THE PAPAL STATES AND ARAGON.

Such, then, is basic explanation of why the conflict erupted in 1494. However, another vital aspect to consider is why they lasted until 1516.

1. The Popes were directly responsible for the two other main phases of the wars – Pope Alexander VI’s invitation to Louis XII to invade Milan (1498), and Pope Julius II’s invitation to the Holy League to attack Venice (1508). By our standards, the Popes were corrupt and wordly, but in their defence the Great Schism had led to the emergence of two rival Popes (in Rome and Avignon), and it was therefore crucial later Popes were worldy and magnificent enough to preserve their independence. Vanity and magnificence were to be applauded in Renaissance rulers, and as a result Alexander VI “was far from disastrous for the Papacy” (Plumb) and Julius II was “More of a soldier and a statesman than a cleric” (Lotherington).

            However, in the longer term Popes became ever more corrupt, and therefore undermined the Papacy and the peninsula as a whole. Sixtus IV, as well as his shameful involvement in the Pazzi Conspiracy, put his nephews (the Della Roveres) into ecclesiastical posts in the Romagna. Alexander VI gave political and military power to his illegitimate and homicidal son Cesare Borgia and used his daughter  Lucrezia as a diplomatic pawn in marriage agreements. Louis XII was invited to invade Milan by Alexander VI and it was this sort of thing that led Machiavelli to remark of this Pope that he “Never did anything, or thought of anything, other than deceiving men”.

2. Ferdinand of Aragon: Outside of the peninsula, the major blame for prolonging the wars lies with Ferdinand of Aragon. He combined diplomacy and conflict in equal measure to counter the mighty power of France and thereby protect the Aragonese maritime empire in the Mediterranean (e.g. Sicily and the Balearic Islands). At the very point at which he was extracting concessions from Charles VIII in return for a promise of non-intervention in Italy, he was also busily scheming to produce the anti-French alliance which was to demolish the French King. This “Holy League” was a ramshackle collection of powers held together only by a common fear of France, but in the words of Mattingly “It was in fact a Europe wide coalition of powers against France, the first decisive drawing together of the major states of Europe into a single power system”.

            Ferdinand continued this policy of diplomacy followed by war with Louis XII. The Treaty of Granada (1500) partitioned Naples with France, although it is typical of Ferdinand that he concluded this treaty behind the back of his cousin and ally, the King of Naples (leading Machiavelli to remark that “he never preaches anything but peace and good faith; and he is an enemy of both one and the other”).

            The French eventually invaded south Naples anyway, but Ferdinand’s General Cordoba turned the initial setback of Barletta (1502) into a resounding victory at Cerignola (1503) which was the first battle to be won with hand held gunpowder weapons (of which more later). This was followed by another crushing victory at Garigliano, which led to the French surrendering their claims to Naples in the Treaty of Blois (1505).

            One of the reasons that the wars lasted so long, therefore, was because no side could obtain outright conquest; and the French were particularly unrealistic. They continued to pursue Naples (until 1505) despite the fact that logistically it was impossible to keep hold of, whereas Aragon could keep providing fresh troops from Sicily.

C. DEEPER CAUSES OF THE OUTBREAK OF WAR IN 1494

            We can therefore blame Milan and Naples for starting the wars, in conjunction with the role played by Charles VIII. We can blame the Papacy for prolonging them, along with the diplomatic machinations of the Aragonese. This state-by-state, individual-by-individual approach to the issue is useful in reminding us that for all Machiavelli’s patriotism, “Italy” was no more a reality in Early Modern Europe than “Germany” or “Christendom”. Nevertheless, in a way it misses the point, since it overlooks that political power is only a means to an end – in other words, the only desire for obtaining power is so that one can do something with it. At this point we therefore decide to identify what the combatants aimed to get out of political power in Italy, and why they felt that war was likely to succeed as a means of getting it.

(i) What did the combatants want?

One word will suffice – plunder. Guiccardini, the contemporary Italian historian, said that

            Not only did Italy abound in inhabitants, merchandise and riches, but she was also highly renowned for the magnificence of many princes, for the splendour of so many most noble and beautiful cities, as the seat of majesty and religion.

            The Roman Empire had created a city life whose emphasis on the town rather than the soil gave Italy a dynamic, mercantile character in which “No one who was poor could find it easy to acquire honour and fame by means of his virtues” (Alberti).. With the exception of the Low Countries, Italy was the most heavily populated part of Western Europe. Half the cities with a population of more than 50,000 were Italian. Venice was an unrivalled commercial port with almost as much wealth as Spain. Milan enjoyed a booming cloth trade. Florence was the fulcrum of the Renaissance and an international banking centre.

            Much of this wealth stemmed from geography - its massive amount of coastline and its position as a crossroads between East and West made it the “cockpit of Europe” in a number of respects – religiously, during the Crusades it provided a meeting point for all nationalities on their way to the Holy Land; economically and culturally, it was highly receptive to new trade and ideas from the East. Geography had made Italy wealthy, and therefore highly attractive to foreign invaders.

(ii) Why did combatants feel war was the easiest way of getting what they wanted?

            In addition, it was geo-politics which made the foreign powers so convinced that any war waged on this goldmine was likely to succeed - the Italian peninsula was disunited in every conceivable sense.

North versus South contrasts the heirs of the Italic Kingdoms with those of the Byzantine dependants. East versus West highlights Venetian and Genoese rivalries and their Eastern and Western Mediterranean contacts. City versus countryside pits an international economic profile against a feudal and agrarian one, as well as a dominant political centre against a dominated periphery (Marino).

            We move, then, from considering why the foreign powers wanted to get involved to why they saw war as a feasible method of obtaining it. In this sense, we need to consider the weak political and diplomatic systems which characterised the peninsula.

            On the face of it, the Italian State system was a source of strength. The Peace of Lodi (1494) was a mutually defensive alliance designed to prevent wars between the states, and to provide a united front against foreign invaders. This formed the basis of a 40 year period of political consolidation, economic growth and investment in culture “upon which depends the welfare of all Italy” (Bentivoglio). Renaissance diplomacy was developed, with the novel idea of resident ambassadors being placed in each state.

            However, diplomacy encouraged warfare in two main ways; firstly, it rather ironically encouraged the participation of foreign powers. The growing power of individual states meant that alliances had to be formed against them, whilst the developments in warfare meant that to be cost effective states needed to know who they could rely on to keep out. In this way, diplomacy encouraged warfare by making it easier to predict the outcome of wars and to arrange alliances against winning powers. In addition, Italian City States had the opportunity, far more than in the rest of Europe, of exiling malcontents and seizing their lands. As a result, we see exiles conniving with the invaders. The Sansevirono clan, exiled in France, promoted Charles VIII’s invasion of Naples; the future Julius II operated from the French court against Alexander VI; the Venetian Leonardo Tressino found service with Maximilian after being exiled on a charge of murder.

            These problems were exacerbated by the fragile political structures which characterised the states. On the surface, each state was rigidly organised: each had a city centre, and a Contado (surrounding rural area) upon which it developed for its supplies and prosperity (e.g. Florence relied for wool industry on the Tuscan hills). Most states were run by a Signory (government) of aristocrats who listened to elected councils when making major decisions (e.g. the Venetian Council of Ten, which advised on whether to make war or peace).

            Nevertheless, the more democratic the system, the weaker the state. The lack of strong centralised leadership within the peninsula meant that Italy was very vulnerable and unstable; the fact that the states were based on mercantilism gave them a great deal of fluidity and entrepreneurial flair, but also meant that political leaders rose and fell much more quickly as a result of their fortunes. This did not bode well for long-term peace between the states, and tensions were always boiling away under the surface of the “Concert of Italy”. Naples was distrusted by all, especially Milan; Florence was a territorial rival of the Papacy and an economic rival of Venice; Venice feared Milan would recapture Lombardy.  As a result, the Italian League was never that united in practice – It had failed miserably to unite with Naples when the Turks took the Naval port of Otranto in 1480, and its terms on armaments limitation were completely flouted – the Papacy was limited to 3000 men, for example, but Paul II had over 8000!

D. DEEPER CAUSES: WHY DID THE WARS LAST UNTIL 1516?

            Military factors were most responsible for the wars lasting until 1516. Warfare was regarded as the natural state of things in our century (“As necessary as eating, drinking or any other business” said Luther), and this was combined with rapid developments in military technology.

            Some argue that these developments prolonged the war simply because the lag between technology and tactics led to inefficient and indecisive confrontations. As Dickens points out, there was little evidence that tacticians, with the exception of Cordoba, had mastered how to integrate these new weapons effectively. Gunpowder had not made a real impact as yet, as Guicciardini recognised (“There was such an interval between one shot and another…that that a great deal of time was consumed with very little reward. The Pike had not yet been mastered either (one contemporary stated that Louis XI would not be criticised for putting so much emphasis on manufacturing pikes “if he would also manufacture men capable of handling them”).

            However, the balance of evidence suggests that the real reason why military technology prolonged the wars is because although battles could be won swiftly, they could now just as easily be reversed. Italy was the testing ground not only for gunpowder weapons like the Arquebus, but also for cannon with iron balls, developed for Charles VIII by the military scientist Genouillac. As Bush states, this period “saw fire power moving from a purely auxiliary role to one where it was central and decisive; where the Arquebus was no longer a minor importance of the Pike square, but where the pike square’s principal function was to protect the shot”. Hence the period is characterised by a series of massive engagements: Charles VIII attacked the Florentine fortress of Fivizzano with “bloodshed and danger” rather than “Pomp and display” (Guiccardini). Marching on to the Papal states, the Pope (“oppressed by incredible anxiety and dread”) barricaded himself into the fortress of Sant Angelo. In Naples, the fortress of Monte San Giovanni was battered down in 8 hours, even though it had survived a 7 year siege previously. During the reign of Louis XII, the massive defeat to Cordoba (“El Gran Capitan”) at Cerignola was the first to be won with hand-held gunpowder weapons, and his imaginative use of bridging equipment was instrumental at Garigliano. The Battle of Marignano was perhaps the most graphic example of the changed nature of warfare, with perhaps 16,500 men killed.

            The Italians were clearly bewildered and unprepared for this military revolution, which in turn encouraged the invaders to continue their forays into the peninsula. Firstly, Italy’s tall, thin-walled fortresses were not designed to resist cannon fire, hence the collapse of the fortress of San Giovanni. The states could have maybe avoided being torn apart had they invested some of their wealth in fortifications and weapons, but they chose not to, with a few notable exceptions (e.g. fortresses in Sarzanello and Sarzano in Florence).

            Secondly, the Italians showed a marked reliance on mercenary “Condottieri” captains who were more interested in avoiding casualties and prolonging war. As Machiavelli put it:

Mercenaries are disunited, thirsty for power, undisciplined and disloyal…they avoid defeat so long as they avoid battle…in peacetime you are despoiled by them, and in wartime by the enemy…The present ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else but the reliance placed on mercenary troops for so many years.

The Italian Wars, then, were the result of a peculiar mishmash of factors – in 1494, the wars started due to the distrust between Milan and Naples, combined with the willingness of Charles VIII to get involved. The blame for those wars lasting up until 1516 can be pinned much more to the door of the Papal States and to the machinations of Ferdinand of Aragon. Beyond the name-calling, however, we would be wise to put this episode into a much wider historical context. In the final count, the wars were an expression of deep seated changes taking place throughout Europe. The decline of universalism, the rise of nationalism and anticlericalism, the changing nature of trade and diplomacy, the distracting influence lent by the Ottomans, the technological revolution in armaments: all of these factors played a role. As a case study in the nature of 16^th Century historical change, the Italian Wars is a subject without parallel.

Bibliography:

Renaissance Italy - Robert Hole

The Prince - Niccolo Machiavelli

History of Italy – Guicciardini

At the Court of the Borgia – Johann Burchard

Web links:

History of Italy: http://www.mi.cnr.it/WOI/deagosti/history/0welcome.html

The Medici in Florence: http://www.arca.net/tourism/florence/medici.htm

Online version of “The Civilisation of the Renaissance in Italy” http://www.idbsu.edu/courses/hy309/docs/burckhardt/burckhardt.html

TIMELINE OF THE ITALIAN WARS.